2016-05-09-minutes-public-works-study-session

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In an assessment appeal, the judge must confine his or her review to the action taken by the city council, rather than viewing the assessments de novo or making an independent decision regarding the most desirable method of assessment. The judge should consider the information and evidence presented to the city council and determine whether the action of the council is supported. "Review, therefore, is limited to the record of the proceedings beforethe municipality."Abbenhaus v. CityofYakima, 89 Wn.2d at859. The court in Abbenhaus summarized the scope of review on appeal as follows: Review und erthe statutory standards shou!d notbean independent consideration of the merits of the issue but rather a consideration and evaluation of the decision making process. Upon appeal, only the record of the prior proceedings is considered. Further, this result requires complaining parties to place all relevant information and objections before the proper decision making body, the council, priorto the municipality's decision, instead of permitting iaterattack in the superior court based upon information which the municipality did not have the opportunity to consider. [Abbenhaus v. City of Yakima, 89 Wn.2d at 859-60.1 Since the scope of appeal (that is, the matters which the judge may consider) is limited, the standard of review used by the judge is also strictly limited. A judge may only reverse or modify the decision of the council if he or she determines, based upon the information contained in the record before the city council, that the council's decision was either "arbitrary or capricious" or made upon a "fundamentally wrong basis." The term "arbitrary and capricious" has a well-established meaning in Washington State. It refersto willful and unreasoning action, taken without regard to or consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the action. Where there is room for two opinions, an action taken after due consideration is not arbitrary and capricious even though a reviewing court may believe it to be erroneous. (Abbenhaus v. City of Yakima, B9 Wn.2d at 858-59.1 Whether property assessed for special improvements is specially benefitted by those improvements is a question of fact. Thus, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a conflict in the facts presented to the council relating to special benefits should result in the confirmation of the final assessment if the assessment is appealed. The basis for this rule is explained in In re ElliottAvenue and Milwaukee Street, b4 Wash. 297, 298, 103 P. 20 (1909): The first assignment of error in this case is based upon the facts, and depends upon whether the assessments were too high or not. This is largely a matter of opinion. In this class of cases we said, in In re Seattle, 50 Wash. 402, 97 P. 444, "opinions will differ widely 1/4 as to the benefits to accrue to the different properties within the districts; but this court cannot substitute its judgmentforthe judgment of those whom the law has charged with a duty of establishing the district and apportioning the cost, whenever such difference of opinion may arise." Opinions do differ in this case between the commissioners who made the assessment and the witnesses called by the appellants. As seen above, the evidence in this case is corfiicting. It fails to convince us that the assessments upon the appellant's Jots were excessive or unjust. The order appealed from must therefore be affirmed. 62 local and Road Improvement Districts Manual for Washington State Szrth Edition